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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CLYDE A. JACOBSON and 
REGINA J. JACOBSON, 
Plaintiffs-
Appellants, 
vs . 
CLYDE E. JACOBSON and 
ERMA B. JACOBSON, 
Defendants-
Respondent s . 
Case No. 39,647 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action was initiated in 1974 for the purpose of 
canceling a deed whereby Respondents herein received title to 
the subject property from Appellants. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This matter was tried before the Honorable George E 
Ballif, in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, 
sitting without a jury. The Court made findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and entered judgment for Respondents, the 
Defendants below. The Court found that the deed to the prop-
erty vesting title in the Respondents is absolute and vests 
full legal title free and clear of any and all claims of the 
Appellants. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents submit that the decision of the trial 
court was correct and should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On about August 28, 1962, Appellants purchased the 
property in dispute, approximately twelve acres of land located 
in Utah County, under a Uniform Real Estate Contract. Between 
1962 and 1965, Appellants occupied the home periodicalLy. During 
the early part of 1965, Appellants became delinquent on the pay-
ments for the purchase of the property. The sellers initiated 
foreclosure proceedings. As a result of an Order issued bv 
the Fourth District Court, Appellants were allowed until June 8, 
1965, to pay off the balance of the indebtedness to the sellers 
or a judgment of foreclosure would be entered. 
On the last day that payment could be made, one Earl 
Stubbs, Appellant, and Respondent Jacobson, the father of Appel-
lant Jacobson, met in the office of the sellers1 attorney, 
Heber Grant Ivins. In order to save the property,, Stubbs 
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advanced approximately $10,000.00; and Respondent Jacobson 
advanced $4,538.10 for the payment of the obligation to 
sellers. 
Discussion was had with regard to securing the posi-
tion of Stubbs. As an alternative to a formal mortgage, a 
deed was executed by Appellants. It appears that the deed 
was sent to Stubbs by Attorney Ivins who handled the transac-
tion. The deed was signed by both Clyde A. Jacobson and Regina 
J.Jacobson, Appellants. 
Appellants failed to pay to Stubbs and Clyde E. 
Jacobson the monies advanced to the sellers on June of 1965. 
As a result of the failure to pay by Appellants, Respondent, 
Clyde E. Jacobson, paid off the balance of the debt to Stubbs. 
The deed was subsequently recorded on July 18, 1966. From 
that time until the time of the hearing of this matter, Respon-
dents paid all of the taxes and insurance as they became due 
on the property. No payments of any kind were made by Appel-
lants after 19 65. 
During the period from 1966 to the initiation of 
this action by Appellants, the property was occasionally occu-
pied by Appellants. They, together with other members of 
Respondents1 family, lived on the property. Clyde E. Jacobson, 
father of Appellant, Clyde A. Jacobson, saw that the property 
was taken care of and that the crops were harvested. The owner-
ship of Respondents was not only evidenced by way of recordation 
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but also by open and obvious use of the property. 
POINT I 
EVEN WHEN THE PROCEEDING TO BE REVIEWED IS IN 
EQUITY, THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT 
ARE PRESUMED CORRECT. 
A suit to have a deed, absolute in form, declared 
to be a mortgage, is a suit In equity. Article VIII, Section 
9 of the Utah Constitution allows the Supreme Court to review 
questions of law and fact in equity cases. Crockett v. Nish, 
106 Utah 241, 147 P.2d 853 (L944). In an appropriate case, 
this Court can substitute its judgment for that of the trial 
court, Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1974), but 
it has been made abundantly clear that this does not amount 
to a trial de novo on the merits. The Appellant has the burden 
of proving by a clear preponderance of the evidence that the 
trial court's findings and judgment are erroneous. The Supreme 
Court will review the evidence and all inferences fairly to 
be drawn therefrom in the light favorable to the trial court's 
findings and judgment. Olsen v. Park Daughters Investment Co., 
29 Utah2d 421, 511 P.2d 145 (1973). 
As the Court stated in Del Porto v. Nicolo, 27 Utah2d 
286, 495 P.2d 811 (1972): 
It is true, as plaintiff asserts, that this 
action to avoid deeds is one in equity upon 
-4_ 
which this court has both the prerogative 
and the duty to review and weigh the evi-
dence, and to determine the facts. However, 
in the practical application of that rule, 
it is well established in our decisional 
law that due to the advantaged position of 
the trial court, in close proximity to the 
parties and witnesses, there is indulged a 
presumption of correctness of his findings 
and judgment, with the burden upon the 
appellant to show they were in error; and 
where the evidence is in conflict we do not 
upset his findings merely because we may have 
reviewed the matter differently, but do so 
only if the evidence clearly preponderates 
against them. 
This standard is made even clearer by Crockett v. 
Nish, supra, which is also an appeal from a refusal to declare 
an absolute deed to be a mortgage. There the court recognized 
its duty to make an independent analysis of the evidence, and 
stated: 
. . . if at the end of that investigation we 
are in doubt or even if there be a slight 
preponderance in our minds against the trial 
court's conclusions we will affirm. 
Other jurisdictions have a standard at least this 
stringent. For example, where a trial court resolved conflicting 
evidence in favor of the defendant in an action to cancel a deed, 
the New Mexico Supreme Court considered itself bound thereby. 
Westover v. Harris, 137 P.2d 771, 774 (N.M. 1943). Perhaps a 
better rule is found in Blue River Sawmills, Ltd. v. Gates, 
358 P.2d 239 (Or. 1960), also an action to have an absolute 
deed declared a mortgage. In that case, noting the trial court's 
superior advantage in a matter of this kind, the Oregon Supreme 
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Court was inclined to accept his judgment as "very persuasive11. 
In addition to the foregoing, it should be kept in 
mind that the plaintiff faces an especially strict standard of 
proof that must be met in order to have an absolute deed 
declared a mortgage. The standard is something more than the 
usual requirement of a preponderance, or greater weight of the 
evidence, and something less than proof beyond reasonable 
doubt. Child v. Child, 8 Utah2d 261, 332 P.2d 981, 986 (1958). 
This Court required that the evidence, to be adequate for this 
purpose, must be clear, unequivocal and satisfactory, Corey v. 
Roberts, 82 Utah 445, 25 P.2d 940 (1933); or clear, definite, 
unequivocal and conclusive, Thornley Land and Livestock Co. v. 
Gailey, 105 Utah 519, 143 P.2d 283 (1943). 
Of course, the Court is not limited to examining only 
the instrument itself. It may look at all the circumstances in 
evidence. Parol defeasance is adequate (where not required by 
statute to be in writing), but only where precise, definite and 
certain. Bass v. Bell, 41 S.E. 893 (S.C. 1902). If parol evi-
dence leaves in doubt whether a deed absolute on its face is 
a mortgage, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the absolute 
character of a deed. Lackey v. First National Bank of Oblong, 
32 N.E.2d 949 (111. 1941). 
An independent analysis of the evidence in the present 
case reveals a clear preponderance in favor of the trial court's 
findings and judgment. Even the parol evidence is not helpful 
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to Appellants, as it was admitted in trial that no payments 
have been made, nor even any arrangements made to pay, on what 
Appellants now choose to characterize as a mortgage. (Tr. 72). 
(This issue will be more adequately dealt with herein.) 
POINT II 
THE EQUITABLE DEFENSES OF "UNCLEAN HANDS" 
AND LACHES PRECLUDE THE APPELLANTS FROM 
MAINTAINING A SUIT IN EQUITY. 
A. The Appellant comes into a court of equity with 
"unclean hands", and therefore is not entitled to equitable 
relief. 
The Appellants have engaged in illegal, fraudulent 
and unconscionable conduct, related to this land controversy, 
such that no court of equity should even entertain their claim, 
far less grant them relief. In order for this equitable defense 
to operate against a party plaintiff, his wrongful actions do 
not necessarily have to be fraudulent or illegal, but any uncon-
scientious conduct upon his part which is connected with the 
controversy will repel him from the forum whose very foundation 
is good conscience. De Garmo v. Goldman, 123 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1942) 
Yet Appellant Clyde A. Jacobson, the plaintiff below, committed 
a criminal act with regard to the property in question. The 
record discloses that in approximately 1969, the Appellant 
filed bankruptcy. (Tr. 45). In the course of the bankruptcy 
proceedings, he testified under oath that Respondent, his 
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father, owned the property in question, (Tr. 46). In the 
trial below, his testimony, also under oath, was that he gave 
false testimony in the bankruptcy proceedings. 
Q. (By Mr.Randle) . . .[W]hy did you give 
that testimony in the bankruptcy court? 
A. To save that property. 
0. Why was it important for you to save that 
property? 
A. Well, I am pretty fond of that piece of 
property, is all. 
Q. And why were you "fond11 of it? 
A. I don't know; I just liked it. (Tr.46). 
First degree perjury was a felony in 1969 and was 
covered by the former Criminal Code, §§ 76-45-1 through 76-
45-13 (see especially §76-45-7), Utah Code Ann. (1953). The 
new Criminal Code, which was in effect at the time of the trial 
below, makes perjury a second degree felony, §§76-8-501 through 
76-8-505 (see especially §76-8-502), Utah Code Ann. (1953), 
as amended. Whether Appellant committed perjury in the bankruptcy 
action or in the trial below Is not certain, and this is not a 
criminal trial for perjury. But Appellant has obviously sworn 
falsely under oath at one time or the other in order to secure 
property that he was flfondlf of. He should be estopped from 
claiming any interest now. Reddy v. Aldrich, 11 So. 828 (Miss. 
1892). Fondness for property never was a justification for 
perjury, theft, robbery or any other crime. 
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Appellant has "unclean hands11 in another regard 
aside from the perjury. In the trial below, counsel for the 
plaintiff took pains to establish that the purpose in handling 
the conveyance in the manner in which it was done was to keep 
the property out of reach of Appellant's judgment creditors. 
(Tr. 7, 104, 113). The rule applies here that equity will not 
intervene to set aside at the request of a grantor a conveyance 
made in fraud of creditors. Under the "clean hands11 maxim, a 
court of equity will not lend its aid to one who has been a 
participant in a transaction the purpose of which was to 
defraud creditors. Wickham v. Simpler, 180 P.2d 171 (Okla. 
1946). The fact that an absolute conveyance is purportedly 
a mortgage rather than a deed is one of the "badges of fraud". 
So also is a delay in recordation of instruments affecting 
real property. Chester B. Brown Co. v. Goff, 403 P.2d 855, 
859 (Idaho 1965). 
It begins to appear that Appellant has asserted or 
denied ownership according to his own convenience. This may 
also serve to estop him from asking relief in equity. In Rh ine 
v. Terry, 143 P.2d 684 (Colo. 1943), the plaintiff denied owner-
ship whenever it would be a burden and asserted ownership when-
ever there might be a benefit derived, all to the detriment of 
the defendant. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court 
in holding that the plaintiff's action for a declaratory judg-
ment that defendant held title as security rather than in fee 
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simple was properly dismissed under the "unclean hands" maxim. 
B. The Appellant's suit is barred by laches . 
Equity will not lend its aid to the enforcement of 
stale demands. McKinnon v. Bradley, 165 P.2d 286 (Or. 1946). 
The doctrine of laches is derived from the maxim that equity 
aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights. 
Arnold v. Melani, 449 P.2d 800 (Wash. 1969). 
Laches is not mere delay, but delay which works to 
the disadvantage of another. In order to constitute laches, 
the two elements must be established: (1) The lack of dili-
gence on the part of the plaintiff; (2) An injury to defendant 
owing to such lack of diligence. Papanikolas Bros. Enterprises 
v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Assoc., 535 P.2d 12 5 6 (Utah 1975). 
In determining whether laches will bar a particular 
claim, it is proper to consider whether a party or an important 
witness has died, and the party against whom the claim is asserted 
has been deprived thereby of important testimony, or whether the 
property involved has increased in value, or whether the prop-
erty has passed into the hands of an innocent third party, or 
whether the position of the parties is so changed otherwise 
that an injustice will follow failure to apply the doctrine. 
Barrett v. Zenisek, 315 P.2d 1001, 1007 (Mont. 1957). 
Applying these statements of law to the present case, 
it is clear that laches should bar Appellants from recovery. 
First of all, Appellants could have sued for a declaratory 
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judgment anytime after 1966 when the deed naming Respondents 
as grantees was recorded (Tr. 8), but they waited for eight 
years, until 1974, to commence this action. Second, now 
Clyde E. Jacobson, one of the original defendants, has died 
and taken his testimony with him to the grave. Erma B. 
Jacobson, his wife and a co-defendant, is incapacitated and 
unable to give testimony. Third, according to counsel for 
the Appellants, the property has increased in value from 
$14,000.00 to over $60,000.00 (Tr. 4). Fourth, parts of the 
property have passed into the hands of innocent third parties 
(Tr. 9, 66). From all these facts, it is apparent that the 
position of the parties is so changed that an injustice will 
follow a failure to apply the doctrine of laches. Barrett 
v. Zenisek, supra. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT THE 
EVIDENCE FAILS TO ESTABLISH THAT THE 
WARRANTY DEED WAS INTENDED AS A MORTGAGE. 
A. The Appellants did not sustain their burden 
of proof. 
A party asserting that a deed absolute in form was 
given to secure a debt, and therefore is in fact a mortgage, 
has the burden of proving the assertion by evidence that is 
clear, definite, unequivocal and conclusive, Thornley Land 
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and Livestock Co. v. Gailey, supra. A deed will not be found 
to be a mortgage on vague, uncertain or contradictory evi-
dence, Reeves v. Abercrombie, 19 So. 41 (Ala. 1895), and any 
doubt must be resolved in favor of the absolute character of 
a deed, Lackey v. First National Bank of Oblong, supra. The 
Appellants had a full and fair hearing, even to the extent 
of allowing testimony that is arguably barred by the Dead 
Man's Statute, §78-24-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended, 
(Tr. 29-36, 67-70), yet they failed to convince the trial 
court. They do not have any lighter burden before this Court. 
^ • All the necessary element s o f a _y SL lid deed were 
present. 
It is undisputed that the deed in question was 
delivered and accepted. Although there was some dispute as 
to the property description and the acknowledgement, the 
attorney who prepared the papers testified upon cross examina-
tion that the legal description was on the deed at the time 
it was signed (Tr. 117-118), and on direct and cross examina-
tion testified that he would not have acknowledged the signa-
tures of grantors had they not appeared before him and signed 
in his presence. (Tr. 108, 109; 115, 117). Appellant also 
admitted that the signatures were not forged. 
Q. (By Mr. Stott) Well, your signature 
isn't forged is it? 
A. No, my signature is not forged. 
Q. And your wife's signature is not forged, 
is it? 
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A. No, it's not forged. (Tr. 55). 
Q. So the record is straight, and counsel 
and I understand your testimony, your 
wife's signature and your signature is 
not forged as they appear on the document 
now, are they? 
A. No, It's not a forged signature. No. (Tr. 57). 
The only question left is whether the grantees were 
named in the conveyance. In the first place, the acknowledg-
ment and recordation of a deed give rise to a presumption of 
genuineness, due execution and delivery. This presumption 
should not be regarded lightly but should be given great weight, 
and not overthrown by a mere preponderance of the evidence. 
Northcrest, Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust Company, 122 Utah 268, 
248 P.2d 692 (1952); 1 C.J.S. Acknowledgments §141, p. 901. 
Second, at the time that the grantees names were 
filled in, the grantors intended that the grantees should take 
title. This intent was shown by the subsequent conduct of 
the parties, as will be discussed infra. Even if the grantee's 
name is not filled in at the time of acknowledgment, if the 
blank is filled in by one who had authority to complete the 
instrument, the deed becomes operative as a conveyance. 
Burnham v. Eschler, 116 Utah 61, 208 P.2d 96 (1949). Some cases 
have held that a deed delivered in blank to the grantee gives 
him authority to fill it out in his own name or in the name 
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of his grantee or purchaser, and the conveyance relates back 
to the time of execution by the grantor. Fisher v. Paup, 180 
N.W. 167 (Iowa 1920); Hoey v. Ebert, 258 N.W. 228 (Mich. 1935); 
Holliday v. Clark, 110 S.W.2d 1110 (Mo. 1937). It is not 
necessary that the deed be re-executed or re-acknowledged when 
the grantee's name is filled in. Burnham v. Es chler, supra. 
In the present case, the grantees' names were filled 
in with the express or imp lied authority of the grantors, as 
subsequent events showed. In any event, when Respondent paid 
the full price for the property he became the equitable owner 
of the premises and was entitled to a deed, even if the grantor 
had refused. Cf. Hoey v. Ebert, supra. Any transactions with, 
or intent with regards to, Mr. Stubbs are therefore immaterial 
her e. 
C. Based on the evidence before the trial court , 
the necessary elements of a mortgage were not present. 
It is true, as Appellant contends, that no particular 
form is necessary to constitute an enforceable mortgage. Bybee 
v. Stuart, 112 Utah 461, 189 P.2d 118 (1948). However, Bybee 
v. Stuart is not good authority for the Appellant in this case 
because in Bybee there was a separate writing, contemporaneous 
with the deed, and the two documents taken together constituted 
a formal mortgage. In the present case not only do we have no 
separate writing, but we don't have any parol evidence as to 
what the security agreement consisted of. What we do have is 
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the Appellant's testimony that there never really was any 
security agreement at all. 
Q. (By Mr. Stott) And your testimony 
further, as I understood it, was that 
there never really was any type of an 
arrangement or agreement that you had 
with your father as to how this money 
was to be repaid or in what manner it 
was to be repaid by, or under what terms, 
is that right? 
A. No. 
Q. You never did have an arrangement with 
him then, did you? 
A. We never did, no. 
Q. It was also your testimony, as I noted 
it, that there never was an arrangement 
between you and Mr. Stubbs, was there? 
A. No. (Tr. 72). 
This case is closely analogous to Hunter v. Bane, 
149 S.E. 467 (Va. 1929), in which the Court's finding that 
no mortgage existed was "inevitable" when the record showed 
that the grantor conveyed property encumbered with deed of 
trust liens to prevent foreclosure; no definite time was stated 
in the deed for repayment of the money advanced by grantee to 
relieve grantor of financial embarrassment; no offer was ever 
made by grantor to repay the money; there was no express agree-
ment in the deed in regard to payment of interest; grantee 
improved the property; and grantee paid the taxes and insurance 
on the property for a period of years. In addition, the Court 
noted that the fact that grantor had "remained in part posses-
sion of the property, when viewed in light of the circumstances 
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detailed, cannot be regarded as inconsistent with an absolute 
conveyance of the same." 149 S.E. at 469. 
In the present case, the trial court found that no 
evidence was introduced of the essential terms of a mortgage 
such as interest rate, term of repayment, or other requirements 
of any enforceable mortgage or security agreement. The Court 
further found that such essential elements would not be provided 
by the Court for the parties. 
D. The subsequent actions and conduct of the parties 
show that Appellants intended to, and did, convey all interest 
in the property to Respondents. 
In determining whether an absolute deed was intended 
as a deed or a mortgage, the courts may look at the relative 
situation of the parties prior to, at the time of and after 
the execution of the instruments, Holmes v. Basham, 45 S.E.2d 
252 (W.Va. 1947); their conduct, Morris v. Rickmeyer, 82 P.2d 
472 (Cal. 1938); and their subsequent dealings with the prop-
erty, Thornley Land and Livestock Co. v. Gailey, supra; Corey 
v. Roberts, supra. 
The following factors and circumstances show that 
Appellants intended to and in fact did abandon alL claims or 
interest in the property: 
1. Appellant Regina Jacobson, in her initial plead-
ing of a divorce suit brought against Clyde A. Jacobson in 
1973, claimed no interest in the property. The latter, in his 
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responsive pleadings, likewise failed to claim an interest 
in the property. (Tr. 60, 61). 
2. In bankruptcy proceedings, as evidenced by the 
certified record from the bankruptcy court, an exhibit in this 
case, Appellant not only failed to claim an interest in the 
property, but testified under oath that it belonged to Respon-
dent. This Court may well choose to believe that testimony. 
3. For much of the time between the conveyance to 
Respondents and the present, Appellants did not occupy the 
premises. By Appellant's own testimony in court, he established 
that he moved in and out. (Tr. 49). He was gone for one four-
to-six month period. On another occasion, he moved to a home 
in Payson while Respondents' daughter and son-in-law occupied 
the premises for just short of a year, (Tr. 50). Finally, in 
1973, Appellants abandoned the property completely and moved 
to Orem (Tr. 51) where they continue to reside. 
4. In addition to these absences, Appellants only 
assisted occasionally in managing or maintaining the property. 
It was farmed and maintained primarily by the Respondents, 
who openly dealt with the property as their own. 
5. Appellants made no payments at all on what they 
now choose to characterize as a mortgage. 
Q. (By Mr. Stott) During the time that you 
lived on the property, you paid no one any 
sums of money for your occupancy on the 
property, did you? 
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A. No. (Tr. 62) 
Q. And you have paid nothing toward, either 
to Mr. Stubbs or to your father, or to 
your father's estate toward the purchase 
of that property, have you? 
A. No. (Tr. 72). 
There was some testimony that Appellant helped his 
father out on weekends, but there was no evidence whatsoever 
of the value of those services or that they were pursuant to 
an agreement. For all that appears on the record, such actions 
were nothing more than what any son would do for his father. 
6. The Respondents conveyed away part of the land 
and received the payments therefor. (Tr. 9). 
7. The Respondents paid all the taxes, insurance, 
and assessments on the property from the time of the conveyance 
to the present. No taxes, insurance or assessments were paid 
by the Appellants during that entire period. (The Appellant 
contends that he allowed the Respondent to take the money from 
the lease payments and the crop harvest to pay the taxes. 
However, that is not probative of ownership in this case, 
because whether or not that money was Appellant's to give 
depends upon ownership of the property. That is the whole 
question in issue here.) 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellants paid a down payment and two years1 worth 
of monthly installments, plus incidental weekend favors, for 
a piece of property they now acknowledge is worth in excess of 
$60,000.00. They claim this property free and clear. They 
are not really asking this Court to declare the deed a mortgage. 
That would involve interest rates, terms of repayment, etc., 
which the Court cannot supply for the parties. They are really 
asking this Court to just give them the property. Respondents 
paid full price for the property years ago, recorded their 
deed, paid the taxes, insurance, etc., and generally treated 
the property as their own. Appellants had notice of to whom 
the title was registered since 1966, but waited eight years 
to assert their ownership. Now the Respondents are dead or 
incapacitated and unable to effectively defend their title. 
Thus, especially in light of the Appellants1 uncon-
scionable and illegal conduct with respect to the property, 
it would be a manifest injustice to the Respondents and their 
heirs or devisees to wrest the property from them and give 
it to Appellants. The judgment of the trial court is clearly 
correct and should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
/ / I ' JF**#---
GARY i/T/STOTT 
84 Eas-t 100 South 
Provo, Utah 84601 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that two true and exact copies 
of the foregoing Brief of Respondents were mailed to W. Jerry 
Ungricht, 807 East South Temple, Suite #202, Salt Lake City, 
UT 84103, this sJD^ day of CJcc^ , 1976. 
i^&£? <7/U/3j/0L 
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